{"id":1425,"date":"2015-09-16T17:25:35","date_gmt":"2015-09-17T00:25:35","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/?p=1425"},"modified":"2015-09-16T17:25:35","modified_gmt":"2015-09-17T00:25:35","slug":"spirituality-rene-descartes-cogito-ergo-sum-part-6","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/?p=1425","title":{"rendered":"Spirituality &#8211; Ren\u00e9 Descartes &#8211; Cogito Ergo Sum (Part  6)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Criticisms<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>There have been a number of criticisms of the argument. One concerns the nature of the step from &#8220;I am thinking&#8221; to &#8220;I exist.&#8221; The contention is that this is a syllogistic inference, for it appears to require the extra premise: &#8220;Whatever has the property of thinking, exists&#8221;, a premise Descartes did not justify. In fact, he conceded that there would indeed be an extra premise needed, but denied that the cogito is a syllogism (see below).<\/p>\n<p>To argue that the cogito is not a syllogism, one may call it self-evident that &#8220;Whatever has the property of thinking, exists&#8221;. In plain English, it seems incoherent to actually doubt that one exists and is doubting. Strict skeptics maintain that only the property of &#8216;thinking&#8217; is indubitably a property of the meditator (presumably, they imagine it possible that a thing thinks but does not exist). This countercriticism is similar to the ideas of Jaakko Hintikka, who offers a nonsyllogistic interpretation of cogito ergo sum. He claimed that one simply cannot doubt the proposition &#8220;I exist&#8221;. To be mistaken about the proposition would mean something impossible: I do not exist, but I am still wrong.<\/p>\n<p>Perhaps a more relevant contention is whether the &#8220;I&#8221; to which Descartes refers is justified. In Descartes, The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams provides a history and full evaluation of this issue. Apparently, the first scholar who raised the problem was Pierre Gassendi. He &#8220;points out that recognition that one has a set of thoughts does not imply that one is a particular thinker or another. Were we to move from the observation that there is thinking occurring to the attribution of this thinking to a particular agent, we would simply assume what we set out to prove, namely, that there exists a particular person endowed with the capacity for thought&#8221;. In other words, &#8220;the only claim that is indubitable here is the agent-independent claim that there is cognitive activity present&#8221;. The objection, as presented by Georg Lichtenberg, is that rather than supposing an entity that is thinking, Descartes should have said: &#8220;thinking is occurring.&#8221; That is, whatever the force of the cogito, Descartes draws too much from it; the existence of a thinking thing, the reference of the &#8220;I,&#8221; is more than the cogito can justify. Friedrich Nietzsche criticized the phrase in that it presupposes that there is an &#8220;I&#8221;, that there is such an activity as &#8220;thinking&#8221;, and that &#8220;I&#8221; know what &#8220;thinking&#8221; is. He suggested a more appropriate phrase would be &#8220;it thinks.&#8221; In other words, the &#8220;I&#8221; in &#8220;I think&#8221; could be similar to the &#8220;It&#8221; in &#8220;It is raining.&#8221; David Hume claims that the philosophers who argue for a self that can be found using reason are confusing &#8220;similarity&#8221; with &#8220;identity&#8221;. This means that the similarity of our thoughts and the continuity of them in this similarity do not mean that we can identify ourselves as a self but that our thoughts are similar.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Luc Paquin<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Criticisms There have been a number of criticisms of the argument. One concerns the nature of the step from &#8220;I am thinking&#8221; to &#8220;I exist.&#8221; The contention is that this is a syllogistic inference, for it appears to require the extra premise: &#8220;Whatever has the property of thinking, exists&#8221;, a premise Descartes did not justify. &#8230; <a title=\"Spirituality &#8211; Ren\u00e9 Descartes &#8211; Cogito Ergo Sum (Part  6)\" class=\"read-more\" href=\"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/?p=1425\" aria-label=\"Read more about Spirituality &#8211; Ren\u00e9 Descartes &#8211; Cogito Ergo Sum (Part  6)\">Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[9,11,21,15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1425","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-family","category-friend","category-philosophy","category-spirituality"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1425","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1425"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1425\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1427,"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1425\/revisions\/1427"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1425"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1425"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.sassquatch.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1425"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}